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Beyond Logic and norms:  a FigurationaL critique oF 
institutionaL theory in organisation studies
Paddy Dolan, Dublin Institute of  Technology, Ireland.
John Connolly, Dublin City University, Ireland
Abstract: This paper provides a figurational critique of  one of  the most 
dominant theoretical frames within organisation studies - institutional theory. 
Despite its status as the leading theoretical lens for explaining organisational 
change, institutional theorists continue to struggle with the so called agency-
structure issue and remain divided in how to overcome it. Our primary 
criticisms concern the propensity to invoke or generate dualisms, the reliance 
on the sociological frames which sustain this, and the failure to engage in any 
comprehensive way with Elias’s writings on this subject. 
Keywords: Figurational theory, Elias, Institutional theory, Agency-structure, 
Organisational change 
Contacts: Paddy.dolan@dit.ie  
Introduction
To date the application of  Elias’s theoretical ideas and concepts to organisation 
studies has been relatively limited (Connolly 2015; Connolly, Dolan, 2011, 2013, 
2017; Dopson 2001, 2005; Dopson, Waddington 1996; Newton 1999, 2001, 2003, 
2004, 2010; van Iterson et alii 2002; van Iterson, Mastenbroek, Soeters 2001) and his 
influence marginal. This eschewing of  Elias’s approach is somewhat surprising given 
that organisational theorists have applied or co-opted the wider theoretical frames 
associated with sociologists such as Anthony Giddens, Pierre Bourdieu and Margaret 
Archer specifically in seeking to address the what is called the ‘structure-agency’ issue; a 
position we will return to in greater detail later in this article. Readers here will perhaps 
be rather familiar with an Eliasian approach. To that end, our aim here is not to merely 
summarise what we feel are relevant aspects of  Elias’s formulations to organisational 
studies, essentially retracing what has been comprehensively done before. Rather, the 
trajectory of  this paper is more critical in orientation, providing a figurational reading 
and critique of  a specific, though clearly dominant, strand of  thinking and theory 
within the organisation studies literature on the subject of  organisational change. 
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Critical comparisons have previously been made between figurational sociology and 
other theoretical approaches applied within organisation studies and the sociology of  
organisations. Tim Newton’s (1999, 2001, 2003) work, in particular, has documented 
the symmetries and variances between a figurational approach and actor-network 
theory, labour process theory and a Foucauldian approach. Indeed, several of  our own 
contributions in this field both overlaps and extends this by comparing figurational 
sociology with other network approaches, discursive approaches, path dependency 
theory (Connolly, Dolan 2017a; Dolan, Connolly (forthcoming)) and institutional 
theory (Connolly, Dolan 2013). It is the latter frame that we return to here. Institutional 
theory is one of  the most dominant, it has even be labelled «hegemonic» (Willmott 
2010), theoretical strands or schools, within the broad church of  theoretical frames 
applied to organisation studies. Our reason for seeking to ‘target’ institutional theory 
specifically is not so much its apparent status as the leading theoretical lens within 
organisation studies but the often uncritical acceptance of  some of  the theoretical 
formulations underpinning it. Certainly several organisational scholars have directed 
some critical attention at institutional theory (see Suddaby, Greenwood 2009) - though 
not from a figurational perspective. And while differences exist between institutional 
theorists particularly around the sociological influences which they draw from, there is 
occasionally a circling of  wagons effect when it comes to more targeted criticism from 
those outside the fold. Furthermore, any review of  the leading organisational journals, 
conference proceedings and contributions, and the citations associated with leading 
exponents of  an institutional approach clearly illustrates the dominance of  institutional 
theory. What we find somewhat perplexing is that this occurs despite persistent 
insecurities amongst institutional theorists over the ‘structure-agency’ issue, and how 
to address it, and a failure to acknowledge figurational sociology as a competing theory 
that directly tackles this issue. 
A figurational critique of  institutional theory 
The so called ‘structure-agency’ issue has received considerable attention from those 
aligned to institutional theory. However, institutional theorists have tended to relabel 
it as the ‘paradox of  embedded agency’ (e.g. Battilana 2006; Delbridge, Edwards 2013; 
Mutch 2007; Seo, Creed 2002; Walker, Schlosser, Deephouse 2014). As Holm (1995: 
398) succinctly puts it: «How can actors change institutions if  their actions, intentions, 
and rationality are all conditioned by the very institution they wish to change». In that 
sense, it is to all intents and purposes the structure-agency issue in a different guise. 
As is well established for many within the sociological community, Elias’s overall 
theoretical framework and the comprehensive body of  work connected with it is 
specifically directed at reframing and dissolving the dualisms of  ‘structure-agency’ or 
‘individual-society’ (Kilminster 2007). An Eliasian approach conceives of  people as 
always in interdependence with others. It is not the case of  the individual first existing 
and then becoming interdependent with others. There is no separation between 
‘individual’ and their ‘environment’. Despite Elias’s extensive body of  work which 
always emphasises and explains this, and plethora of  texts from figurational scholars 
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which both summarise and identify this element of  his work, there has been very 
little engagement from institutional theorists with this aspect of  Elias’s theoretical 
formulations. They to generate what Elias (2012 [1970]:113) argued is a senseless 
separation between individual and society:
… like tables and chairs, or pots and pans. One can find oneself  caught up in 
long discussions of  the nature of  the relationship between these two apparently 
separate objects. Yet on another level of  awareness one may know perfectly well 
that societies are composed of  individuals, and that individuals can only posses 
specifically human characteristics such as their abilities to speak, think and live, in 
and through their relationship with other people - ‘in society’.
Of  course what makes the lack of  engagement with Elias’s work more surprising, if  
not unusual, has been the turn by both organisational theorists more generally, as well as 
institutional theorists, to other sociologists in their efforts to address the issue. Anthony 
Giddens’ structuration theory became prominent amongst organisational scholars 
in their efforts to address the issue (Mutch 2007).  For instance, Barley and Tolbert 
(1997:94) draw on structuration theory to «articulate a model of  how institutions are 
formed, reproduced, and modified through an interplay of  action and structure». Barley 
and Tolbert propose a recursive model and methodology based on structuration theory 
for examining institutionalisation processes empirically. Although they comprehensively 
document how we can observe and identify change, the prime deficiency in the model 
is that it does not explain why such change occurs, a conclusion also drawn by Seo and 
Creed (2002). Barley and Tolbert’s model describes four sequential stages while still 
maintaining the very division the authors sought to surmount. For example, the first 
stage of  their model entails the encoding of  institutional principles in scripts - known 
as the behaviour regularities of  actors. However, there is no explanation as to why 
the process occurs; how and why specific principles are encoded at a specific social 
juncture. 
Ironically, while our critique is aimed at structuration theory’s re-enforcement of  
duality, other organisational scholars (Hodgson 2007; Leca, Naccache 2006) contend 
that overcoming the ‘paradox of  embedded agency’ requires the development of  a 
non-conflating institutional theory - the need to maintain a separation between 
agency and structure so that the interrelationships that mutually shape each can be 
examined. In turn, critical realism has been advocated as the (non-conflating) theory 
capable of  achieving this. Consequently, several of  those rejecting Giddens, and other 
approaches, have tended to deploy Margaret Archer’s ideas and the wider framework 
of  critical realism from which it originates (Delbridge, Edwards 2013; Kirkpatrick, 
Ackroyd 2003; Leca, Naccache 2006; Mutch 2007). Although Archer acknowledges, 
and is briefly complimentary of  Elias, there is from the outset a fundamental difference 
which cannot in any way be bridged by the suggestion that both their approaches are 
relational. The key difference stems from Archer’s (1996) contention and belief  around 
the duality of  structure and agency, to which she gives ontological status. For instance, 
she describes it as the «basic issue» or «central dilemma» in modern social theory. Her 
insistence on duality puts her on a direct collision course with Elias who conceived of  
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them as distinct but inseparable. Elias (2010[1987]:15) advocated a
more realistic picture of  people who, through their basic dispositions and 
inclinations, are directed towards and linked with each other in the most diverse 
ways. These people make up webs of  interdependence or figurations of  many 
kinds. 
Not only are such webs always in process but so too is the structure of  a person’s 
social habitus which points to another key difference with Archer. Archer’s theoretical 
contentions and formulations betray a static conception of  human dispositions. This 
is evident even amongst studies which have mobilised her lens using historical data. 
For instance, Mutch (2007: 1130) leverages a conceptual formulation of  Archer’s, 
the «autonomous reflective», to characterise the brewer Andrew Barclay Walker. 
«Autonomous reflectives» are conceptualised as: 
... society’s strategists, because they are swift to take decisions... pursue their own 
projects in a way that is likely to bring them into conflict with existing structures, 
structures that they either seek to use or change in pursuit of  their wider projects. 
In that sense, the «autonomous reflexive» appears as somewhat discrete and 
universal as they are imbued with a level of  rationality that seems to transcend 
time and space. For instance, Archer’s empirical work was based on interviews with 
contemporary subjects while Mutch’s is directed at early to mid-nineteenth century 
subjects. There is little indication that social dispositions, and one’s capacity to engage 
in various activities in specific ways, may be a function of  a greater capacity for 
rationalisation or foresight as Elias would contend. Equally, while Mutch traces many 
of  the direct relations that shaped Walker, there is little sense of  the wider structure 
of  social relations in which he was positioned, and which may have constrained or 
empowered his ability to develop innovations or how this may have changed. For 
instance, in our own work on the expansion of  advertising at Arthur Guinness & 
Sons Ltd (Connolly, Dolan 2017b) we illustrate how the decision by senior managers 
to initiate direct advertising in Britain was enabled by a rise in the power chances of  
the middle classes relative to the landed classes which produced a social structure 
more conducive to commerce and advertising. This changing power ratio between 
bourgeoisie and those above (the aristocracy and gentry) and those below (lower 
class groups) shaped, propelled and constrained opportunities for innovation across 
a myriad of  social spheres (see Dunning, Sheard 1979). 
Perhaps it is Pierre Bourdieu more than any other sociologist who has had the 
most significant influence on institutional theory. Moreover, in recent times, his 
theoretical approach has been exalted as the prism through which ‘the paradox of  
embedded’ agency might be addressed (Battilana 2006; Gomez, Bouty 2011). Like 
Elias, Bourdieu advocated a relational sociology and used the concept of  habitus - 
though concerns have been expressed that his conceptualisation leaves little room for 
agency (King 2000, 2005; Mutch 2003). For instance, Mutch draws upon an earlier 
critique of  Bourdieu by Bernstein (1996: 136) in which he contends: 
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The formation of  the internal structure of  the particular habitus, the mode of  its 
specific acquisition, which gives it its specificity, is not described. How it comes 
to be is not part of  the description, only what it does. There is no description of  
its particular formation (Cited in Mutch 2007: 392). 
Elias’s approach to habitus and the wider theory within which it is framed does 
precisely this - explaining not only how the habitus changes but its capacity to, 
simultaneously, retain aspects of  past social relations within the habitus. 
Gomez and Bouty (2011) in seeking to explain a new innovation in haute cuisine 
connected with the French chef  Alain Passard uses Bourdieu’s concepts of  practice, 
habitus and field. They present what they describe as «seven characteristic elements 
of  Passard’s habitus» (p.930) - what appears to be Passard’s habitus at the time of  
the study (in 2000). Yet, there is no sense that the habitus is mutable and how any 
change in habitus led to the innovation. Passard’s position within the field is also 
viewed as a key determinant. However, as King (2000: 426) argues more generally, 
the connection between field and habitus while suggesting «a richer account of  
social life because it highlights the struggle inherent in social life», does not solve the 
problem of  change and instead re-generates the structure-agency dualism «because 
they [field and habitus] transform the interactions between individuals into objective, 
systemic properties which are prior to individuals». The concept of  field also brings 
us to a crucial difference between the approaches of  Elias and Bourdieu. While an 
analysis of  an individual’s changing position within a figuration and the power ratios 
between those comprising a figuration are central to Elias’s approach, there are key 
differences between the concept of  field and that of  figuration. In Bourdieu’s model, 
fields are constructed around specific activities, like sport, business, gastronomy and 
leisure (a formulation new institutionalism tends to implicitly follow). But what field 
is being occupied when people play golf  and talk about new business opportunities, 
and continue the conversation over drinks in the clubhouse? The model of  figuration 
connects people rather than activities, precisely because it’s the same people whether 
working in the office or eating lunch in a nearby restaurant. 
Another lens is that advocated by Seo and Creed (2002) which involves a dialectical 
perspective and the concept of  praxis, underpinned by a Marxist analysis of  social 
structure and a focus on long-term processes. According to Seo and Creed the model 
can resolve the ‘paradox of  embedded agency’: first, by identifying the critical role of  
agents (praxis) in institutional change; second, and more importantly, «by depicting 
the dialectical processes through which the actions and consciousness of  those agents 
not only are shaped by existing institutional arrangements but also are continuously 
reshaped by institutions’ inevitable by-products - institutional contradictions» (p.226). 
Praxis is deemed critical. Individuals develop a self-awareness and critical understanding 
of  prevailing social conditions and one’s position within this; individuals’ collective 
mobilisation in the face of  this; and, finally, action to reconstruct the existing social 
arrangements. While asymmetrical power relations are acknowledged, the model’s 
underlying frame is of  individuals with static, timeless and universal structures of  
thinking (or dispositions generally). Consequently, awareness of  one’s status or 
position within the existing structure of  power relations appears almost as a moment 
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of  epiphany for some specific actors. When an individual’s beliefs and values change 
they are expressions of  the ‘inner’ self  in isolation of  others - rather than connected to 
any transformation in the very structure of  the dispositions of  people more generally. 
As noted previously, institutional theorists identify the concept of  «institutional 
logics» as a central aspect of  explaining organisational change. For instance, Rao, Monin 
and Durand (2003: 797) lead «with the premise that institutional logics are the organizing 
principles that furnish guidelines to actors as to how to behave». The logics appear to 
act as discrete software programmes determining social action, one replacing the other 
over time, with less emphasis on the intermingling and blending of  cultural principles. 
As Elias (1978[1970]: 76-80) argues, groups can act in opposition to interdependent 
groups without following particular rules of  engagement. The actions of  such groups 
interweave without the use of  shared norms, yet such processes have a clear structure 
and immanent dynamic. Even though Rao et al acknowledge the presence of  reward 
and punishment systems, thereby following a utilitarian logic themselves, the emphasis 
remains on the power of  institutional logics. These logics constitute the identities of  
actors, and rival identities then compete for behavioural expression within each actor. 
Here the internalised logics appear to be subjectified to the extent that they organise 
the individual’s actions. For Rao et al the sources of  organisational change are 
identity-discrepancy cues’ including the sociopolitical legitimacy of  activists, 
theorization of  new roles to be adopted, defections of  peers from the traditional 
logic to the insurgent logic, and gains that accrue to prior defectors (p. 797). 
In effect, this means that role occupants switch institutional logics if  new logic 
adherents have high levels of  legitimacy based on professional success under the older 
logic, if  the content and functions of  the new role are well articulated in media and 
other communication channels, if  people move from one logic to the other, and of  
such defectors gain success and legitimacy under the new logic. So it seems to be a 
rather psychologistic (or social psychologistic) account of  organisational change based 
on rational choice or utilitarian considerations - the very perspective institutional theory 
sought to overcome. People move once others do, based on social comparison and 
emulation. This is of  course an aspect of  social interdependencies, in that one person’s 
actions depend on another’s, but there is little sense of  the structural mechanisms of  
organisational change beyond the desire to abandon a sinking ship and the allure of  a 
floating one on the horizon. Of  course the metaphor only carries us so far, in that the 
more people that abandon the organisational ship the quicker it sinks.
Rao et al do acknowledge contradictions and mutability internal to each logic. 
Tension between logics also fosters change, but the problem remains in the definition 
and delineation of  each logic. They appear more like Weber’s ideal types than real 
cultural formations based on social interaction, interdependence, cooperation and 
antagonism. The logic is constructed by the analyst from activities of  people, and 
subsequently used to explain those very activities. A figurational approach locates 
competing cultures more tightly to inter- and intra-group dynamics. So Elias speaks 
of  court and bourgeois rationalities in the context of  class conflict and the different 
network of  mutual obligations in which courtiers and businessmen are embedded. To 
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the extent that such obligations and functions subsequently overlap or further diverge 
the different rationalities intermingle, creating a hybrid cultural form, or become more 
detached. 
For Rao et al, nouvelle cuisine emerges because cultural entrepreneurs notice the 
changeability of  classical cuisine, and then successfully argue that given it has changed, 
it could change yet again, and so there is no basis for claiming a single, dominant 
gastronomic form. These entrepreneurs were also inspired by changes in other fields 
such as drama and literature. If  the former dominant schools of  thought in literature can 
be challenged by new styles of  prose, then why not classical cuisine with new menus? 
Rao et al locate the source of  change in specific, momentous events like the French 
Revolution and the social turmoil of  May 1968. A figurational approach sees social 
change as a more gradual process, though changing interdependencies can produce 
social revolutions if  the old guard try to maintain superior status far beyond the phase 
when their actual power chances had declined. To use a geological metaphor, Rao et 
al attribute the change to the earthquake, while Elias identifies the gradual movements 
of  tectonic plates. This conceptualisation of  change as a long-term on-going process 
is central to a figurational approach (see for example Dunning, Murphy, Williams 
1988). As we argued previously (see Connolly, Dolan 2013), once organisations form, 
it is the changing interdependencies between those individuals and groups at an intra-
organisational level, at inter-organisational level, and between social groups on a higher 
level of  integration and competition, and the overlapping and intertwining of  these 
that explains the type and degree of  organisational change (see also Dunning, Sheard 
1976).
Conclusion 
We don’t deny that there are certain symmetries between institutional theory and 
figurational theory (Connolly, Dolan 2013), nor that there are positions taken by 
advocates of  an institutional approach that we would not wholeheartedly support  - the 
need for historical methods in explaining organisational change (Suddaby, Greenwood 
2009) being an example. However, there are far more fundamental distinctions, not least 
the dualisms created by institutionalists. Institutional theorists appear to be engaged in 
what van Krieken (2002: 256) calls, 
an endless cycle of  posing a dichotomy, using it, criticizing it, suggesting some 
sort of  synthesis (e.g. structuration), and then strangely going back to using it 
again. 
The figurational approach effectively bypasses debates between structure and agency, 
and between macro and micro levels of  organisation, as all are different sides of  the 
same coin. Linked with this tendency to generate dualisms is the fact that institutional 
theory continues to draw from, and sustain the position of, philosophy in social research 
which is counter to Elias’s thinking and approach (see Kilminster 2007). What is also 
very perceptible when reading institutional accounts, in contrast with figurational 
work, is the absence of  people. Institutional accounts are replete with concepts and 
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phrases such as institutions, logics, meanings, organisations, cognitive understandings, 
systems, fields, norms  yet the people connected with these, as whole human beings, 
don’t really find expression to anywhere near the same extent. For Elias on the other 
hand incorporating the ‘rough and tumble’ of  people’s lives is crucial in any account 
of  social processes and structures. People (in interdependence) are at the core and 
readers are permitted to see real people with emotions, constraints and contradictions. 
In Elias’s (2006[1969], 2012[1939], 2013[1989]; also Elias, Scotson 2008[1965]) own 
writings there is a certain style which provides rich and vivid accounts of  the characters 
and social settings. Yet it is this apparent lucidness and the vivid portrayal of  the lives 
of  people that masks the depth and scale of  his theoretical formulations. 
It remains a source of  puzzlement to us that Elias’s work continues to remain 
marginal in addressing the so called structure-agency issue within organisational research. 
Elias (or those of  us who engage with his approach and formulations) are occasionally 
mentioned in passing but any deeper consideration is avoided. That the focus of  Elias’s 
work is so relevant and clearly related to the issues examined by organisational scholars, 
and that so many of  Elias’s contemporaries remain a continuing source of  engagement 
and influence, makes his invisibility all the more remarkable. But truth be told we are 
not surprised given what Kilminster (2007: 152-153) suggests is required in committing 
to an Eliasian perspective, among them the abandonment of  philosophy, Marxism and 
fashionable social theory, the suspension of  political ideologies, developing a distance 
from economics, history and psychology, and the realisation that one’s reputation and 
academic career could be stalled. Sadly, the engagements that are more likely to occur 
are ones where Elias is briefly cited or a few concepts are applied and acknowledged 
in tandem with concepts from other theorists as theoretical pluralism or the ‘pick and 
mix’ approach to social scientific endeavour solidifies. Indeed, the presentism creeping 
into some figurational-sociological work, or the tendency towards discussing Eliasian 
concepts without bringing them to bear in a considered and comprehensive way to 
develop empirical-theoretical explanations, are but further manifestations of  this 
overall trend where concern with short-term career development trumps the long-
term perspective. 
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